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Abstract 
 
The European Union's (EU) Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is an 
instrument which still lacks strategic guidance. It remains unclear whether CSDP 
should be primarily used in the EU's vicinity or on a global scale. This paper discusses 
t o  w h a t  e x t e n t  i t  w o u l d  b e  b e n e f i c i a l  f o r  t h e  U n i o n  t o  f o c u s  C S D P  o n  a  r e g i o n a l  
rather than global level. It argues that positioning CSDP as a regional Ordnungs-
macht helps the EU tackle long-standing structural security challenges while at the 
same time offering a viable approach to the EU's global responsibilities. The paper 
thus proposes a policy reorientation of CSDP that shifts the EU's aspiration from being 
a global actor to becoming a regional Ordnungsmacht. Such a change would 
narrow the existing capabilities-expectations gap and strike a balance with other 
regional actors such as the US, Russia and Turkey. Simultaneously, a withdrawal of 
CSDP from the global arena could be matched by an increase of EU support to 
other regional security organisations as is shown by the example of the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). 
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1. Introduction  
 
The end of the Cold War produced a complex security environment, particularly so 
for the European Union. Faced with crises in its own backyard and the decline of its 
comfortable position under the United States security umbrella, Brussels was obliged 
to take on responsibilities in the realm of security. As an answer to these demands the 
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) emerged – a security instrument which 
in Coelmont's words possesses "no clear strategy" (Coelmont, 2010).  
  This is even more deplorable as authors repeatedly emphasise that CSDP 
serves as a motor for the entire Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 
(Marangoni, 2008). Hence, we must wonder where an engine with no sense of 
direction is taking us: will CSDP remain a EU policy instrument that is "not regional but 
rather global in nature" (Bono, 2006, p. 431)? Or will the engine slow down and – in 
the light of limited resources and hesitant member states – focus on its region, as 
globally it is "not up to the responsibilities of the time" (Robinson, 2010, p. 15)? Still, 
what does such a region look like, as a regional security system has yet to emerge 
and the EU "lacks regional delimitations, [and] its geographical boundaries remain as 
yet undefined" (Bono, 2006, p. 432)? Also, if a regional reorientation occurs, how will 
the EU deal with other regional stakeholders and its global security responsibilities?  
  Biscop reminds us that CSDP is at a strategic impasse and that immediate 
choices are necessary as the EU "cannot be a status quo power that seeks to 
maintain current conditions: its agenda entails a commitment to proactively shape 
its environment" (Biscop, 2009, p. 7). The above suggests three interlinked sets of 
questions about CSDP for our research (Figure 1): what is its scope of action 
(geography), what is its goal of action (order), and what are its means of action 
(power)? 
  Based on these thoughts this paper examines to what extent it would be 
beneficial for the EU to position the instrument of CSDP in the framework of a regional 
Ordnungsmacht rather than in the context of a global actor. 
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Figure 1: Scope, goal and means  
 
To answer these questions we need to identify the underlying key challenges, 
which materialise as a multiple research lacuna. First, we can identify a policy lacuna, 
i.e. a lacking vision for the use of CSDP. The 2001 Laeken Declaration asked early on 
"[w]hat is Europe's role in this changed world? Does Europe not [...] have a leading 
role to play in a new world order" (European Council, 2001, p. 2)? Nine years later 
President Van Rompuy still echoes the same question: "Where do we go? [...] Where 
do we want to be in ten or twenty years time ahead?" (Van Rompuy, 2010).  
  Second, possible answers offered by a geo-strategic approach are neglected 
by policy-makers and under-studied by contemporary scholars (Buzan & Weaver, 
2003; Kiacioglu, 2008). Hence, a geographical lacuna materialises despite the 
current trend towards more security activity in regional organisations and the fact 
that Hill first drew attention to the EU as a possible 'regional pacifier' nearly 20 years 
ago (Hill, 1993).  
  Third, the strain between CSDP's regional and global ambitions – most 
noticeable in the European Security Strategy (ESS), which seeks to "build […] security 
in our neighbourhood" and at the same time "build […] a better world" – is perceived 
but not addressed by scholars and policy-makers (European Council, 2003, p. 1). 
Caught "between two stools - globalism and regionalism" the ESS mirrors CSDP's 
strategy lacuna (Posen, 2004, p. 37).  
  These three gaps add up to a conceptual lacuna which this paper addresses 
primarily. The traditional notions of hegemony and empire are not apt to capture the 
dynamics and ambitions of CSDP (Bailes, 2009). To remedy this lacuna, the paper 
proposes the concept of regional Ordnungsmacht – marked by the balance of 
limited means with desired goals in a restrained scope. Institutionalisation, resource-
consciousness and a quest for legitimacy are the Ordnungsmacht's defining features. 
Smart power, defined by Clinton as the use of "the full range of tools at our disposal - 
  5 Tobias Felix Franke 
diplomatic, economic, military, political, legal, and cultural", is another key trait of 
the Ordnungsmacht (quoted in CBS, 2009).  
  Situating itself at the juncture of the three interlinked research lacunae, the 
paper seeks to contribute to the narrowing of this gap in current literature and policy. 
It argues that positioning CSDP as a regional Ordnungsmacht would help the EU 
tackle long-standing structural security challenges while at the same time offering a 
viable approach to the EU's global responsibilities. It proposes a policy reorientation 
of CSDP that would narrow the existing capabilities-expectations gap and strike a 
balance with other regional actors such as the US, Russia and Turkey. Simultaneously, 
downsizing the EU’s aspirations from the global to the regional level could go hand in 
hand with an increase of EU support to other regional security organisations such as 
ASEAN. 
  Following this introduction, part 2 defines the notion of regional Ordnungs-
macht and applies these findings to CSDP. It then elaborates on the importance of 
the region and geostrategy. Finally, it sets out what the paper understands by CSDP's 
r e g i o n .  P a r t  3  h i g h l i g h t s  a d v a n t a g e s  o f  C S D P ' s  p o l i c y  r e o r i e n t a t i o n  f o r  t h e  E U ' s  
capabilities-expectations gap (3.1.) and the relationship with the US, Russia and 
Turkey – arguably three key stakeholders in European security (3.2.). In so doing, the 
paper uses the notions of realisability, acceptability and sustainability as criteria of 
assessment (Mahncke, 2007). Part 4 then addresses the paper's potential critics who 
hold that a narrow regional approach might endanger the EU's global security 
responsibilities. It evaluates Brussels’ utility as a supporter of other regional 
organisations as an alternative order to global CSDP actorness. The Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations – deemed by Murray as the least likely example for EU 
influence – serves as a case study (Murray, 2010b). Part 5 concludes the paper and 
provides some policy recommendations. 
 
 
2. Towards a regional Ordnungsmacht 
 
Bailes emphasises that the traditional notions of empire and hegemony are ill-suited 
for CSDP and suggests testing alternative concepts (Bailes, 2009). The novel but 
understudied regional Ordnungsmacht approach has so far only been applied to 
Australia and its security architecture in the southern Pacific (Der Spiegel, 2006), 
Nigeria's position in western Africa (Bergstresser & Tull, 2008) and South Africa's 
regional security policy since the end of the apartheid regime (Interview with Davies, 
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2010). Synthesising these works, the following definition can be derived. A regional 
Ordnungsmacht balances means (power), goals (order), and scope (geography). Its 
actions rely chiefly on overlapping interests with the target states, legitimised by 
home and host audiences' acceptance and expectations of power. To this end, a 
comprehensive smart power approach is followed to create a mutually beneficial, 
collective security order. Its efforts spring from an institutionalised setting, 
guaranteeing respect for rules and procedures. The regional Ordnungsmacht's 
scope is resource-conscious, bringing to bear capacities in a limited field (security) 
and a limited locality (the region).  
  H o w e v e r ,  t o  w h a t  e x t e n t  d o e s  C S D P  a s  t h e  i n s t r u m e n t  o f  a  m u l t i n a t i o n a l  
security organisation fulfil the criteria of s u c h  a  d e f i n i t i o n  w h i c h  i s  b a s e d  o n  t h e  
classical conception of states (see Annex 1)? Three of the definition’s nine points are 
uncontroversial as current CSDP practice and the model of Ordnungsmacht overlap: 
First, current CSDP power accumulation relies on reciprocal justification, i.e. third 
countries "demand and desire its presence" (Hardeman, 2010). Second, CSDP's order 
is highly institutionalised (e.g. the involvement of numerous committees and decision-
making bodies in the launch of a mission) and subject to formal and informal rules 
and procedures. Third, the functional scope of CSDP's activity is limited to the security 
sector proper. These three fitting points function as the stepping stones of a regional 
Ordnungsmacht's global responsibilities (part 4).  
  A further four points of the definition are only partially in line with the 
Ordnungsmacht  model. First, CSDP's power is maintained by a redistribution of 
resources to other actors to enhance security. The 24 CSDP missions underline this 
logic. Still, the regional focus of action is lacking and hence CSDP has taken up tasks 
mostly as a reaction to calls by third states but not in an active, preventative manner 
(Asseburg & Kempin, 2009). Uncoordinated redistribution of the resource security also 
has repercussions for the nature of the approach: comprehensiveness is 
compromised as resources are spread and not concentrated (e.g. the only punctual 
military engagement in Chad).  In Lecoutre's words, the "balance between the three 
D's – defence, diplomacy and development" (Lecoutre, 2010, p. 5), i.e. the 
combination of "hard and soft power into a winning strategy" (Nye, 2006), also known 
as smart power, is less pronounced in today's CSDP. Second, and as a result of the 
previous point, Kernic et al. stipulate that CSDP's power might decline as legitimacy 
solely arises from government support, whereas there has "thus far been no 
concerted [...] effort to educate the public about the salient issue” of CSDP (Kernic 
  7 Tobias Felix Franke 
et al., 2002, p. 12). As studies show, public diplomacy, as a key component of smart 
power, is crucial for enhancing legitimacy in both home and host audiences 
(Council on Foreign Relations, 2003). The highly heterogeneous identity of the EU and 
its CSDP lend this point additional prominence. Third and fourth, since CSDP lacks a 
clearer regional focus, the Ordnungsmacht's premise of structuring the security 
environment in a mutually beneficial way and accommodating regional partners is 
harder to achieve. The absence of security strategies for neighbouring actors is 
testimony to this trend. These partially fitting four points build the core of a policy 
reorientation, the advantages of which are outlined in part 3.  
  Lastly, two points of the Ordnungsmacht concept appear out of line with 
current CSDP practice. First, the geographical scope of CSDP action arises from an 
over-ambition and not a realistic assessment of resources at hand. The Council 
repeating in February 2010 that "[t]he European Union is a global actor, ready to 
undertake its share of responsibility for global security", while at the same time barely 
mustering an extra handful of helicopters for European Union Force (EUFOR) 
Chad/Central African Republic (CAR), is but one example (Council of the European 
Union, 2010, p. 1). This leads, secondly, to the possible decline of scope since a 
material overstretch is not countered by a clear regional agenda. These two points 
relating to geography, which do not fit the concept’s definition, are now explored 
further.  
  Having defined the concept of Ordnungsmacht and applied it to today's 
CSDP, one must wonder what justifies the attribute regional? Put differently, why not 
follow a German newspaper calling for a global Ordnungsmacht (Westfalenpost, 
2008)? Similarly, Brzezinski opposes the paper’s argument stating that "[g]eopolitics 
has moved from the regional to the global dimension" (Brzezinski, 1997, p. 39). 
However, in the CSDP context we should not neglect the following: geostrategy's 
core task is to "bring […] a distinction between enduring and transient interests" (Koc, 
2009, p. 10). When analysing the 1999-2009 European Council/Presidency 
conclusions and External Relations Council meeting press releases, one can observe 
that security issues in the neighbourhood have been continuously mentioned, thus 
qualifying them as enduring interests, while more distant localities, for example the 
crises in Congo, have been discussed only when crises arose and while missions were 
active, hence rendering those interests transient (European Council, 1999-2009). 
Lannon supports this analysis, elaborating that the neighbourhood profits from a 
genuine common interest of all member states (Lannon, 2010). 
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  Moreover, geostrategy is "a question not just of having power in the sense of 
human or material resources, but also of the geographical context within which that 
power is exercised" (Sloan & Gray, 2009, p. 2). Since resources are limited states "are 
unable [...] to conduct a tous asimuths foreign policy. Instead they must focus [...] on 
specific areas of the world" (Grygiel, 2006, p. 23). In a time where governments are 
forced to cut military spending and "legitimacy will be the hard currency in 
international relations" necessary to mobilise resources in society (Gnesotto & Grevi, 
2006, p. 198), public opinion will be crucial. In fact, the European public cares only 
marginally about a global role for CSDP, while support for regional engagement is 
high (Biscop, 2009; Brummer, 2007; Isernia & Everts, 2006). This assessment is shared by 
neighbouring countries, 75% of which  regard an enhanced regional role for the EU 
as positive (European Council in Foreign Relations, 2007). Hence, the region remains 
of key importance for what can best be understood as a mutually enforcing 
geostrategic triangle of interests, resources and legitimacy (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2: The geostrategic triangle 
 
 
Having outlined why the region remains of key importance, what then is 
understood by the CSDP's region in the context of a regional Ordnungsmacht? 
Calling a certain area one's region serves to "obtain certain goals", namely to create 
discourse and policies which induce and assure security responsibility for a given 
sphere (De Lombaerde et al., 2010, p. 5). Hence, promising security responsibility for 
the entire globe, as is insinuated in the ESS, creates little effect. "Politicians should 
resist their current inclination to dream up a policy on all issues, regions and conflicts 
in the world", instead one ought to pick three or four policy priorities which will 
"increase the chance of producing one or two much-needed successes" (Everts, 
2004, p. 42). 
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  As Elissalde notes, such a region resembles the current European Neighbour-
hood Policy (ENP), but adds to it the civil-military teeth it has so far been lacking 
(Elissalde, 2006). He stresses that "[c]e voisinage peut être le cadre privilégié 
d'exercice de la puissance européenne [...] dessinant une sphère d'influence propre" 
but not "une aire d'influence exclusive"; therefore, urging us to differentiate between 
different spheres of influence (ibid., p. 275).  
Accordingly, three spheres emerge. The first is an appeased sphere in the 
northwest which demands little or no attention of CSDP. It includes among others 
Switzerland, Norway and Iceland. According to Guney, it is in the east and south 
where the EU's core security interests lie and where it has strived for stability and 
appeasement since the end of the Cold War (Guney, 2008). Second, the Western 
Balkans constitute an "exclusive sphere of influence" (Interview with Bailes, 2010). 
Brussels' security interests are so pronounced there that Bailes even calls it "part of the 
EU's territorial defence" (ibid.). Other "active geostrategic players", i.e. "states that 
have the capacity and the national will to exercise power or influence beyond their 
borders in order to alter [...] the existing geopolitical state of affairs", such as Russia, 
Turkey and the US (see 3.2.), maintain some stakes in this sphere but are sidelined, 
mainly because the Western Balkans' membership perspective dedicates them to 
Brussels (Brzezinski, 1997, p. 40). Third, a shared sphere of influence consists on the one 
hand of six "geopolitical pivots", i.e. states that are of geostrategic importance 
because of, for example, resource transportation, and are hence influenced by 
several players (ibid.). The three Caucasus and the three Eastern European countries 
belong to this group, with the former being under a triple influence of the EU, Turkey 
and Russia, and the latter being influenced by Brussels and Moscow. On the other 
hand, the five Mediterranean countries form an "interlocking region", i.e. a region 
that belongs both to the EU and African Union (AU) regional security complex (Lake, 
1997, p. 54). Their ambiguous security character and the long-standing EU interests in 
the region necessitate CSDP involvement and simultaneously intense coordination 
with the AU (see part 4). The Middle East is a shared sphere with the US, and to some 
degree Turkey, underlining the necessity for a clear strategy towards Washington 
and Ankara.   
  Overall, the exclusive and shared sphere of influence host a considerable 
number of conflicts and security challenges, which form an "arc of instability" around 
the EU's southeast, requiring CSDP's particular attention (Menotti, 2003, p. 15).  
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3. Advantages of positioning CSDP as a regional Ordnungsmacht 
 
Part 2 has tackled the conceptual and geographical lacuna by developing the 
Ordnungsmacht approach and defending its regional outlook. Part 3 now seeks to 
further clarify the policy and strategy lacuna by outlining advantages of the 
proposed CSDP reorientation. In so doing, 3.1. explores the capabilities-expectations 
gap linked to the overarching question of power/means, while 3.2. evaluates the 
triangle of regional stakeholders (order/goals). Both parts touch on the impact for 
the EU's neighbourhood (geography/scope). Policy changes are feasible only if they 
are (financially and politically) realisable, accepted by the various actors involved 
and sustainable, i.e. rooted in a long term effort (Mahncke, 2007). Hence, the sub-
parts will employ realisability, acceptability and sustainability as benchmarks for the 
evaluation of the proposed changes.  
 
3.1. Capabilities-expectations gap 
 
"We should not lower our ambitions but, rather,  
give ourselves the means to realise them."1  
Catherine Ashton 
 
The 2009 and 2010 analyses of the International Security Information Service (ISIS) and 
the IISS find that CSDP's two key capability shortcomings of strategic air lift and force 
projection have "in large part remained" since their identification in 1999 (IISS, 2010, p. 
107). Progress is deemed unlikely as CSDP "has proved to be very slow" with regard to 
procurement and results only materialise in the long term (Herz, 2009, p. 5). Forces 
analyst Bach of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) agrees, estimating 
that if all necessary procurements were made immediately it would still take at least 
ten years for those capabilities to be delivered (Interview with Bach, 2010). Requests 
to deploy helicopters – situated at the juncture of air lift and force projection – to 
distant places such as Chad have been denied due to both a lack of political will 
and the fact that "both aircraft and crews were often unable to fly in demanding 
operational environments such as deserts and mountainous areas" (IISS, 2010, p. 108). 
These shortfalls lead to an average theoretical deployability rate of only 30% of EU 
forces which in practice has not surpassed 5% (Witney, 2008). Such a situation should 
"confine [CSDP's] security interests and activities to [its] near neighbours" (Buzan & 
                                                            
1 Ashton (2010), p. 4.  
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Weaver, 2003, p. 46). Instead, CSDP aims for a global role when it is barely able to 
fulfil a regional one.  
  The European Parliament stresses that the CFSP budget, which finances non-
military CSDP activity, "continues to be underfunded" and casts in doubt the EU's 
ability "to play an active role in the world [... and consequently] to conduct a 
credible and proactive foreign policy" (European Parliament, 2010). With an 
envelope of €2.064 billion for the period of 2007-2013, it only represents 0.24 % of the 
overall EU budget (€864.3 billion) and breaks down to an annual average of €294 
million, an amount which barely matches that of Médecins Sans Frontières ($400 
million) (Grevi et al., 2009). In this situation, 29% of the €220 million allocated to crisis 
response in 2007-2008 went to Sub-Saharan Africa, an area outside the proposed 
region which does not qualify as an enduring CSDP interest (ibid.). In the face of 
continuous member states' disputes about the increase of the budget, liberal MEP 
Duff's demand to augment the overall EU budget from today's 1.1% of Gross National 
Income (GNI) to 2.5%, thereby growing the absolute CFSP budget to approximately  
€725 million, is progressive, but hardly a viable option (Interview with Duff, 2010).  
  In addition, declining member states' defence expenditure  and defence 
budgets hardly support a global role for CSDP. While global expenditure has 
increased by 45% between 1999 and 2008, leading to a 2.4% average of global 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2008 (SIPRI, 2009), combined EU member states' 
expenditure has declined from 2.1% of GDP in 1997 to 1.7% in 2007 (Grevi et al., 2009, 
p. 77). Due to the economic crisis most member states have further cut their 
expenditure since 2008/2009, with the Czech Republic (-12%) and Romania (-17.4%) 
leading the way (IISS, 2010, p. 109). Average EU budgets have declined from 1.8% of 
GDP in 1998 to 1.4% in 2008 (Grevi et al., 2009, p. 77). Analyses by Agence Europe 
indicate that EU-26 budgets in 2010 will decrease by an average of 2% as compared 
to 2009 (Agence Europe, 2010). Low budgets lead to diminished material investments 
per solider; e.g., where the US invests about €100,000 per soldier, the EU average 
figures at around €20,000 (Witney, 2008). This in turn causes, for example, poorly 
trained helicopter staff and decreases the intensity of operations that can be carried 
out (Howorth, 2007).  
  These shortcomings are due to four reasons. First, Morgan points to the 
correlation between decreasing defence spending and the development of post-
modern entities, such as the EU and its member states, towards a pluralistic security 
community (Morgan, 1997). The presence of an internal peace arrangement and 
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the absence of imminent external threats diminish the incentive to increase spending. 
Second, economically liberal-minded European countries traditionally resist high 
resource extraction for military purposes (Solingen, 1997). This tendency is, third, 
exacerbated by the European public, "which will not tolerate the massive increases 
in military spending", necessary for a global role of CSDP (Moravcsik, 2003). Finally, 
scattered and rival European defence industries have lost a share of their influence 
after the Cold War and cannot function as a driver to remedy shortcomings 
(Solingen, 1997). These reasons further substantiate the argument that the above-
mentioned shortfalls are permanent and structural, hence highly unlikely to change. 
  Bearing in mind these findings, Ashton's introductory quote turns into a farce. 
Instead, the model of a resource-conscious Ordnungsmacht follows Hill's thought to 
decrease expectations and to "communicat[e] the fact to outsiders, so that the limits 
of European actorness and intentions are clearly visible" (Hill, 1993, p. 322). Bailes 
claims that such a regional repositioning "would certainly narrow the capabilities-
expectations gap" as strategic lift and force projection would be de-emphasised 
due to a reduced radius of CSDP action from maximum 12,000 km (2005 Aceh 
Monitoring Mission (AMM)) to 3,500 km (proposed Ordnungsmacht region) (Map 2). 
Moreover, existing Cold War capabilities conceived for regional activities would find 
new usability, and current training of professional soldiers and conscripts would fit 
better with the anticipated missions (Interview with Bailes, 2010). Moreover, 
Papayoanou stresses that government and public resource extraction capacity 
increases, the more specific the reference to a particular region (Papayoanou, 1997). 
Additionally, turning CSDP into a regional instrument of intervention "would also make 
CSDP a greener army" and, due to the topicality of climate change, catch on with 
publics to facilitate resource extraction capacity further (Interview with Bailes, 2010). 
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Map 2: Ordnungsmacht radius of action and current CSDP radius2 
 
 
Nevertheless, what are the chances for CSDP's expectations-capabilities 
reorientation in terms of realisability, acceptability and sustainability? The shift 
requires no new procurement and leaves national and EU budgets untouched. It is 
thus primarily a political decision which could be announced in a rewritten ESS. 
Existing missions outside the Ordnungsmacht's realm (currently seven) would continue 
their mandate but then be phased out. Hence, the still relatively modest overall role 
of CSDP facilitates change and enhances realisability.  
  Acceptability also profits from the still developing role of CSDP. Externally, the 
American and Australian continent have not been subject to CSDP missions, leaving 
them a priori indifferent to change. The Asian continent has only witnessed five CSDP 
missions with limited material clout (€192.6 million, i.e. 4.12% of combined overall 
costs for the 24 missions). In addition, missions in the Middle East (three of five) would 
be continued. On account of this, Africa arises as the only external actor with 
possible objections as ten of the 24 CSDP missions have been deployed there, 
equalling €2.456 billion (52.58% of combined overall costs) (Annex 2). Internally, the 
large majority of EU member state governments could accept a limited regional 
focus of their capabilities (Robinson, 2010). The Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for 
example, urges CSDP to "sort out its priorities so it could better deploy its limited 
resources" (Swieboda, 2009). From the implementation report on the ESS we can 
                                                            
2 Map based on Dalet (2010).  
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deduct similar signals: "we need to prioritise our commitments, in line with resources" 
(Council of the European Union, 2008), a mantra now even echoed by the United 
Kingdom; thus somewhat renouncing London's well-known call for global capacities 
(British Ministry of Defence, 2010). This leaves France, traditionally a key stakeholder in 
Africa and a main driver behind the CSDP's African missions, as the most pronounced 
opponent to an Ordnungsmacht approach. Paris’ reservations will be addressed in 
part 4. Concerning the public in the member states, Posen is optimistic saying that "if 
[...] commitment to the pacification of Europe's periphery were more explicit [...] it 
might catch on with European publics" (Posen, 2004, p. 36). At the 2009 Göteborg EU 
defence summit Swedish minister Tolgfors put it as follows: "my priority is to motivate 
the taxpayer to pay for it. [...] The Nordic Battlegroups have cost €100 million [...] and 
the taxpayer can expect concrete results" (Der Standard, 2009).  
  Thus far, most CSDP missions have been little more than a 'symbolic gesture' 
due to their limited staff and resources (Asseburg & Kempin, 2009). According to Hill, 
this reflects the current danger of the capabilities-expectations gap, creating hopes 
and expectations in target states which are frequently disappointed, hence 
undermining EU credibility and impact (Hill, 1993). Approximately €2.578 billion spent 
outside the region could have been saved with the proposed policy reorientation. 
Part of those global savings could be allocated to the regional CSDP missions, which 
so far have made up only 43.29% of overall combined costs (i.e. €2.022 billion) 
(Annex 2) (see also 3.2.). This could significantly improve the capabilities' impact, 
credibility and consequently sustainability.  In other words, CSDP would do less 
quantity, more quality and take responsibility for a region in which its means and 
power count. In a world developing towards more regionalisation this might also land 
on fertile ground as regards other players such as the US, to which we will now turn.  
 
3.2. Triangle of regional stakeholders – the US, Russia and Turkey 
 
"We want strong allies. We are not looking to be patrons of Europe.  
We are looking to be partners of Europe."3 
Barack Obama 
 
A repositioned CSDP is more likely to succeed if the Ordnungsmacht concept yields 
advantages for the different visions of European order of the three essential 
stakeholders in the region: the US, Russia and Turkey.  
                                                            
3 Quoted in Lecoutre (2010), p. 22. 
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  That said, the paper's policy proposal comes at a time of a triple window of 
opportunity: First, on the one hand, the US has not – as predicted by Kagan – fallen 
out with Brussels and formed an antidote to the EU (Kagan, 2002). On the other hand, 
increasing convergence between the two – detected by Moravcsik – has not 
materialised to an extent that fears of Washington shifting its strategic radar to other 
localities are discarded (Moravcsik, 2003). Rather, the Obama administration 
supports CSDP but "is expecting concrete proposals by the EU" that help Washington 
shoulder its worldwide burden (Coelmont, 2010). Second, since September 2008 
Russian President Medvedev has repeatedly called for a new pan-European security 
order, underlining Moscow's desire to reintegrate into the European security realm 
after the August 2008 war with Georgia (Emerson, 2008). Finally, at a moment where 
Turkey is caught between its EU membership aspirations, its internal struggles over the 
influence of the army, and its own increasing role in the region, Ankara awaits 
external signals to help define its security identity (Interview with Bach, 2010).  
  CSDP-NATO relations are at the core of this triangle as all stakeholders are 
directly or indirectly linked to the two actors (Figure 3). The 2010 New Strategic 
Concept (NSC) of NATO – to be adopted in the fall – offers the opportunity to react 
to the Ordnungsmacht's policy changes and subsequently to get "NATO and CSDP 
on the same page" (Interview with Duff, 2010). The key question in this respect 
remains: what division of labour could be envisaged between CSDP and NATO? 
 
Figure 3: CSDP-NATO relations at the core of a regional stakeholder triangle 
 
 
Ojanen stipulates that there can be either a geographical or a functional 
division (Ojanen, 2006). Moravcsik favours the latter giving the US and NATO the 
responsibility for the military instrument while the EU contributes civilian mechanisms 
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(Moravcsik, 2003). Although his proposal does not explicitly spell out that NATO would 
do the cooking and CSDP would do the dishes, it bears the risk that both actors 
would have to act together at all times to be effective, hence undermining each 
other's capacity for autonomous action. Such cannot be in the EU's interest and 
Moravcsik's proposal is unlikely to find sufficient acceptance among member states. 
Conversely, Moïsi  suggests a geographical division, with the EU responsible for its 
region and the US and NATO focusing on the remaining global challenges (Moïsi, 
2003). Bach highlights that this is hard to implement as "the Eastern European and 
Baltic states will not accept a complete disengagement of NATO in Europe due to 
the importance they attach to the guarantees of the North Atlantic Treaty Art. 5" 
(Interview with Bach, 2010).  
 The  Ordnungsmacht  concept advocates the balancing of legitimacy of 
power (i.e. Eastern and Baltic states' concerns must be addressed), a mutually 
beneficial order (i.e. other actors should profit from its goals), its resource-conscious 
regional outlook and own CSDP interests (i.e. autonomy to act). Consequently, it can 
bridge the above impasse by offering a division of labour including geographical 
and functional elements. In so doing, it follows the 2001 proposal of the then NATO 
Secretary-General Robertson whereby CSDP would have a "regional role [... with] 
very specific tasks" (quoted in Ojanen, 2006, p. 68) [emphasis added]. CSDP would 
assume the security responsibility for its region 4  in which it fulfils all extended 
Petersberg tasks, manages relevant missions and further security related tasks, 
except for NATO's Art. 5 territorial defence which would remain an instrument of 
ultima ratio in (the unlikely) case of, for example, a Russian attack on the Baltic. Bach 
deems such an approach "logical and promising" as it "brings all member states – 
including the Eastern and Baltic states – on board" (Interview with Bach, 2010).  
  Moreover, the forthcoming NSC and talks about a revised ESS render the 
policy change easy to implement and thus more realisable. The CSDP mission EULEX 
Kosovo demonstrates that US troops are willing to diminish their role in Europe and 
serve (for the first time) under CSDP command (Lecoutre, 2010). Taking over Kosovo 
Force (KFOR) from NATO would be another logical – albeit more difficult – step to 
increase the proposed policy's realisability.  
  US acceptability can be assumed to be high due to four reasons: First, a clear 
role for NATO is proposed which seeks to help Washington share its global burdens, 
while at the same time demonstrating that a US-led NATO is still desired in Europe. 
                                                            
4 This is without prejudice to the proposed CSDP-US Middle Eastern shared sphere of influence. 
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Striking this balance is seen as crucial by interview partners (Interview with Bach and 
Duff, 2010). Second, in Lebanon (2006) and Georgia (2008), NATO engagement was 
not an acceptable solution for the third parties concerned (Biscop, 2009). For this 
reason, Washington comes to terms with the fact that a strong regional CSDP is a 
better channel for American influence than no channel at all. Third, US Secretary of 
State Clinton has recently announced that the US will strive for a global, multilateral 
division of labour based on a smart power approach – similar to the Ordnungsmacht 
concept – which can contribute to a convergence of perceptions of power in the 
future and hence increase mutual acceptance (CBS, 2009). Finally, positioning CSDP 
as a regional Ordnungsmacht underlines a restrained EU role, which is in line with the 
long-standing US interest of preventing a global rival (Brzezinski, 1997).  
  Russian acceptability can equally be judged as increasing for three reasons: 
Firstly, the Ordnungsmacht concept proposes a clear vision of European order. The 
open character of CSDP allows Russia to influence and participate in – while not 
obtaining a veto over – European security. This is even more important for Moscow as 
the NATO-Russia Council has been of little use for both parties so far and since CSDP 
appears as an active alternative to the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE) (Interview with Bailes, 2010). Secondly, Cooper stresses that modern 
states like Russia still think in terms of relative power (Cooper, 2003). In Bach's words, a 
diminished role of NATO "will be welcomed by Russia because Moscow's generals 
'count tanks', [...] and it has got more than CSDP" (Interview with Bach, 2010). In short, 
Russia would be accorded a perceived relative power advantage. Thirdly, while 
such a comparison of raw capabilities does not figure prominently in EU post-modern 
thinking, a restrained NATO would, nevertheless, soften Moscow's fears of this 
organisation, still described as "one of the biggest security threats to Russia" in its 2010 
security doctrine (Tagesschau, 2010). In return, Moscow's tolerance for CSDP action 
in 'its backyard' – the abovementioned share d  s p h e r e  o f  i n f l u e n c e  –  i s  l i k e l y  t o  
increase.  
  Turkey's acceptance is harder to assess due to the ongoing political changes 
in the country but appears to cluster around a positive neutrality. On one side, Turkey 
has an interest in a strong role of NATO as it gives Ankara a way to influence 
European security which it cannot acquire in CSDP. This is particularly true for the 
Cyprus issue. On the other side, the above outlined acceptance by the US and 
Russia (two key economic and security partners of the Bosporus state) exercises a 
certain pressure on Turkey to accept an eventual policy change (Interview with 
  18 BRIGG Paper 2/2010 
Bach, 2010). Moreover, Bailes highlights that Turkey is not a strong peace-keeping 
nation and is not accepted as a "guardian of neighbouring states" (Interview with 
Bailes, 2010). Given the amount of conflicts in its vicinity, which would also fall into the 
Ordnungsmacht's region, Ankara might welcome a more pronounced CSDP 
engagement. Also, the possibility to participate in CSDP missions – as is already the 
case to some extent in Bosnia and Macedonia – would allow Turkey to underline its 
membership aspirations while at the same time becoming active in a region where it 
seeks to assert its influence (ibid.). In other words, CSDP's policy reorientation would 
be more acceptable as it would give Turkey the chance to engage in the regional 
security dynamic and hence overcome its long-standing Cold War status of an 
insulator or buffer state which "is located in the zone of indifference between 
[regional security complexes], helping to keep separate from each other two or 
more sets of regional security dynamics" (Buzan & Weaver, 2003, p. 483).  
  The favourable evaluation of acceptability by three key regional stakeholders 
already foreshadows a certain degree of sustainability. Moreover, Gnesotto and 
Grevi point out that CSDP has a better image than NATO in the eyes of the European 
public (Gnesotto & Grevi, 2006). Thus, by acting on this 'légitimité propre' of the EU in 
its region, CSDP could gain public approval and make the policy change more 
sustainable (Moïsi, 2003). Yet, a mere relative advantage in public opinion over 
another organisation does not make for deep public sustainability. Hence, Bach and 
Duff stress that the political leaders of the member states have the prime 
responsibility of communicating grand policy changes to the public – an exercise 
neglected by governments after the adoption of the ESS or previous NATO strategic 
concepts (Interview with Bach and Duff, 2010). The communication of missions and 
day-to-day policy then needs to be in the hands of well-staffed public diplomacy 
policy units.  
  Public diplomacy, however, only stands a chance when rhetoric and policy 
are in line. The EU employs a global rhetoric that undermines its credibility and public 
acceptance as words have not matched actions (Interview with Bach, 2010). Hence, 
'going regional' would increase CSDP's credibility and in turn contribute to public 
diplomacy effectiveness, which again helps to convince people; thus creating a 
'virtuous circle' between the three (Figure 4). This synergy is particularly important in 
the EU's neighbourhood because any policy reorientation needs to yield benefits for 
the primary target states for it to be embraced by them. Thus, stronger regional CSDP 
engagement is considered advantageous for them due to three reasons:  
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Figure 4: Virtuous circle of regional commitment, credibility and public diplomacy 
effectiveness 
 
First, a clearer regional focus contributes to a stronger ENP-CSDP nexus which 
has so far been lacking (Hardeman, 2010; Witney, 2008). The Commission itself has 
underlined as early as 2006 that "[t]he ENP has achieved little in supporting the 
resolution of frozen or open conflicts in the region" and asked the EU "to be more 
active, and more present, in regional or multilateral conflict-resolution mechanisms 
and in peace-monitoring or peace-keeping efforts" (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2006). 
  Hence, the short-term instrument of CSDP could, secondly, more actively 
complement the long-term approach of ENP as the Ordnungsmacht's region hosts 
over forty conflicts and security challenges possibly falling within CSDP's portfolio of 
responsibilities. To stabilise Europe's vicinity action is not only required but demanded 
by target states. In 2006, for example, both Moldova and Lebanon called for a CSDP 
mission. While lack of political will might have been one motive, strained resources 
also prevented CSDP engagement (Biscop, 2009). 
  This leads us, third, to the fact that current CSDP missions in the region are 
frequently understaffed and/or possess insufficient resources. The EU Police Mission 
(EUPM) in Bosnia, for example, "had to struggle hard, scratch around for leftovers 
from different budgetary stratagems to put together a mere €14 million" (Gourlay, 
2006, p. 109). Confronted with such a situation, the ESS' statement that "as we 
increase capabilities in the different areas, we should think in terms of a wider 
spectrum of missions", appears out of touch with reality (European Council, 2003, p. 
12). Since capabilities are few, but at the same time CSDP seeks to be 
comprehensive, one has to prevent a multiplication of limited efforts, i.e. having 
several short-term missions which only treat symptoms but do not tackle the 
underlying causes.  
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  Part 3 has outlined advantages arising from a repositioning of CSDP according 
to the Ordnungsmacht concept. The two key examples a of capabilities-expecta-
tions gap (based on the overarching question of power/means) and the triangle of 
regional stakeholders (related to order/goals) have been underpinned by the 
beneficial impact for the neighbourhood (linked to scope/geography). This exercise 
has by and large delivered satisfactory results, thereby narrowing in particular the 
policy and strategy lacunae.  
 
 
4. A response to critics: addressing disadvantages of repositioning CSDP by 
strengthening other regional organisations 
 
"To try to identify a distinctive 'role' for Europe  
in the world is something of a mare's nest."5 
Christopher Hill 
 
Positioning CSDP as a regional Ordnungsmacht is not without its critics. Duff, for 
example, disagrees with the entire paper's argument under part 3, stating that "the 
atmosphere in Brussels is different. Officials want to use the newly acquired powers of 
the Lisbon Treaty and forge a global role for CSDP" (Interview with Duff, 2010). More 
specifically critics might reproach the paper with four points: First, a military is 
necessary to have a say in global affairs. Without it, the EU's global clout might wither. 
Second, in the absence of CSDP, who will address global challenges like terrorism or 
North Korea's nuclear programme? Third, as the ESS highlights, will the first line of 
defence not often be abroad (European Council, 2003)? To recap, would the 
Ordnungsmacht concept lead to "[une] Europe [qui] se transforme en une grande 
Suisse, égoïste, prospère, provinciale et impuissante, dont la neutralité serait 
essentiellement passive et auto-protectrice" (Moïsi, 2003, p. 522)?  
  This part is dedicated to addressing the critics' concerns. In so doing, the 
paper will show that the Ordnungsmacht concept can still contribute to the EU's 
global security responsibilities despite its limited military power but  because of its 
clear vision of order and its clearly defined scope. The Ordnungsmacht concept 
does not neglect global responsibilities but encourages an EU vision of order 
beneficial for Europe and the globe through the promotion of its security model. First, 
we will situate the EU's security model in the transient character of global order. 
Second, we will explore what the EU's security model has to offer and to what extent 
                                                            
5 Hill (1993), p. 307. 
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it has been neglected so far. Finally, ASEAN serves as an example to show that the EU 
is internally able to provide, and externally able to offer, its security model to other 
regional organisations.  
  First, global order continues to be in "geopolitical transition" (Kleine-Brockhoff, 
2009, p. 8). According to several authors, this transition will lead to "the emergence of 
a variety of new regional orders [...] rather than a single world order" (Lake & Morgan, 
1997, p. 3), which will interact in a heteropolar rather than a multipolar system.   
Heteropolarity is described by Copeland as an order in which the military does not 
materialise as the only and primary vector of power; hence taking issue with the 
mainstream trend of categorizing the global system as (classical) multipolar or 
multilateral multipolar (Copeland, 2010; Copeland, forthcoming) (see also Annex 3). 
Rather every actor possesses several vectors of power each of which can be 
different in amplitude. Thus for Copeland the diminutive military power of the EU can 
be balanced by Brussels' regional modelling power (ibid.).  
  In conjunction with Copeland’s argument, Howorth, Gnesotto and Grevi 
predict that regional organisations will consolidate further in terms of regional security 
responsibilities (Gnesotto & Grevi, 2006; Howorth, 2007). Simultaneously, this develop-
ment will lead to increased complexity in global order. Complexity, in turn, renders 
straightforward security responses more difficult (ibid.). Following this line of thought, it 
becomes clear that the EU needs to ensure that in this process of consolidation it 
capitalises on its comparative advantage, i.e. the promotion of its security model, 
with the goal of structuring global order according to its vision. In other words, the 
EU's security model should "aim to reproduce itself through encouraging regional 
integration around the World [sic]" (Guney, 2008, p. 123). Promoting Brussels' model is 
also regarded as important by Van Langenhove who links order to the medium and 
long-term demographic and economic forecasts: "In the next 10 to 25 years Europe's 
relative demographic and economic power will decline. Subsequently, we will 
neither have the people nor the money to play a global role" (Interview with Van 
Langenhove, 2010).  
  Moreover, Bailes argues that current state-power poles either seek to 
decrease their global security engagement – the US – or show little enthusiasm to 
engage to a significant extent – Russia and China (Interview with Bailes, 2010). 
Consequently, she estimates that regional organisations will by default be burdened 
with the majority of future security interventions. These organisations will be the EU's 
potential future partners in international fora, which can be won over more swiftly if 
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similarly modelled mind-sets exist (ibid.). In the long term Willenberg expects this 
approach to "transform political adversaries into cooperating allies or even security 
communities, thereby reducing the instances of raw power politics of modern states 
and contributing to civilised, post-modern patterns of interactions" (Willenberg, 2009, 
p. 4). As a result, strengthening other regional organisations' capacities to take care 
of their own security challenges does not only disburden CSDP globally but 
simultaneously appears to be a structural imperative. 
  Second, at the core of the EU's security model and the proposed 
Ordnungsmacht concept lie its institutions. Traditionally, security institutions have 
served the purpose of "aggregation of preferences into coalitions, to logrolling 
partners and to the robustness and longevity of obtaining coalitions" (Solingen, 1997, 
p. 100). In the post-modern world institutions go beyond this and log in "sustainable 
stability [which] can be secured only by procedures, instruments and habits of 
interaction, interest accommodation and peaceful conflict resolution" (Mahncke, 
2007, p. 226). The EU institutions possess these characteristics and have the 
experience and capacity necessary to share them with other organisations. In the 
realm of economic institutions, the EU's comparative advantage materialised in 1991 
when at its creation the Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR) opted for an EU-
inspired model of integration instead of the American free trade model (De 
Lombaerde & Schulz, 2010). This has, however, not translated into similar activity in 
the security sector. 
  As Copeland stipulates, in a heteropolar world, there will be "highly complex 
balancing between dynamic poles, and knowledge-driven problem solving to 
address common threats and challenges" (Copeland, forthcoming) [emphasis 
added]. Knowledge about institutional arrangements suddenly becomes a valuable 
asset. In contrast with colonial powers, the EU's security institutions are flexible enough 
not to prescribe a one-to-one implementation of their arrangements, but to offer 
institutional "frameworks of authority" (Bailes & Cottey, 2006, p. 223), which can be 
filled with the local security conditions of each organisation. Hence, Moravcsik 
"challenges the conventional view that Europe's global influence is declining", but 
claims that it "is, in fact, rising", as its "true geopolitical advantage lies in projecting 
civilian influence" which rests to a large extent on "its distinctive institutions" 
(Moravcsik, 2009, p. 403). Biscop adds that it is in the best interests of the EU to spread 
this value of security institutionalisation (Biscop, 2009). Art. 21, para. 1 of the TEU after 
Lisbon sets out that "[t]he Union shall seek to develop relations and build partnerships 
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with [...] international, regional or global organizations" (European Union, 2008). Art. 
22 furthermore allows for a decision to address a particular region or regional 
organisation (ibid.). In sum, capacities and legal basis exist for the EU to promote its 
security model.  
  Yet, so far the EU has largely neglected other regional organisations in general, 
and the promotion of its security model in particular. Bailes stresses that 
European joint efforts abroad have not given highest priority to 
supporting – or even to monitoring and analyzing – other regions' 
multilateral processes. [...] Elsewhere, the EU instinct seems to be to handle 
itself as a quasi-national 'pole' [instead of a regional organisation] and to 
seek an accommodation first and foremost with the strongest national 
actor in each region: with the USA rather than NAFTA [North American 
Free Trade Agreement], Russia and not the CIS [Commonwealth of 
Independent States], China rather than [...] ASEAN, and so forth (Bailes, 
2009, p. 13).  
 
Similarly, in February 2010 Van Rompuy demands to "strengthen our relationship with 
key partners. [...] Above all the United States, Canada, Russia, China, Japan, India, 
Brazil" (Van Rompuy, 2010). Regional organisations do not figure on his agenda. The 
security sector, in particular, neglects regional organisations. The ESS only mentions 
them once, saying succinctly that "regional organizations also strengthen global 
governance", without, however, putting forth any agenda for action (European 
Council, 2003, p. 9). Consequently, only one out of nine current CSDP mandates for 
operations in Africa contains "an element that explicitly aims to strengthen regional 
organizations" (Asseburg & Kempin, 2009). Moreover, in the few existing region-to-
region contacts Brussels relies on just three pillars: political dialogue, development 
cooperation and trade relations (De Lombaerde & Schulz, 2010). Given the above-
mentioned opportunities, institutional security cooperation with regional organisat-
ions should become a fourth pillar of region-to-region interaction. Asseburg and 
Kempin deem such a fourth pillar as "decisive for future burden-sharing in crisis 
response" (Asseburg & Kempin, 2009, p. 157). Duff and Coelmont though are more 
sceptical about other regional organisations and are convinced that they will not be 
capable to take care of their regional security challenges (Interview with Duff, 2010; 
Coelmont, 2010).  
  Third, with the example of ASEAN, we can, however, argue that increased EU 
engagement has the potential to bring about beneficial results for both Brussels and 
Jakarta. Five points justify selecting ASEAN as a case study: ASEAN's founding 
document (the 1967 Bangkok Declaration) and subsequent papers give it a legal 
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mandate for regional security. Moreover, security figures in practice as a "key 
concern" among ASEAN leaders (Murray, 2010a, p. 67). Recent calls for "increased 
cooperation on security issues" substantiate this development (ibid.). In addition, the 
2007 ASEAN Charter calls for enhanced institutionalisation of the security realm (ibid.). 
These calls are echoed within and outside of ASEAN, with the Australian Prime 
Minister Rudd saying that 
we need strong and effective regional institutions [to] enhanc[e] a sense 
of security community (we have something to learn from Europe where 
centuries of animosity have been transformed into an unparalleled 
degree of transnational cooperation) (Rudd, 2008).  
 
While he does not see the EU as an "identikit model" for Southeast Asia, he does stress 
their modelling power in terms of security organisations (ibid.). Finally, Murray 
anticipates ASEAN to be one of the least likely cases to respond to the proposed EU 
effort to strengthen other regional organisations (Murray, 2010b). Thus, if the paper 
succeeds in finding indicators pointing in the direction of expected beneficial results 
in this case, a stronger claim can be made for the proposed policy in other regional 
organisations with a security component, such as the AU.  
  Three examples underline that ASEAN and its institutions are key for the EU's 
vision of global order and in line with the Ordnungsmacht concept. First, the AMM is 
generally seen as a minor but satisfactory CSDP mission (Asseburg & Kempin, 2009). 
Notwithstanding, it is pointed out that the cooperation with ASEAN was necessary as 
Asian troops had a better understanding of the conflict and were familiar with the 
customs and language – expertise that the European part of AMM was lacking 
(Murray, 2010b). Hence, the institutional capacity of ASEAN, i.e. the ability to take a 
decision and send Asian staff, became an important factor in the clearing of CSDP 
responsibilities. As Acharya points out, regional actors are increasingly in demand to 
amplify the voice of, for example, the EU (Acharya, 2008). This is, second, illuminated 
even further by the example of the 2009 typhoon which hit Myanmar. In this case the 
EU did not only need ASEAN to improve its performance but to be able to perform at 
all. The isolated regime in Pyinmana did not want to accept any direct assistance 
from the EU. Subsequently, Brussels channelled its aid through ASEAN (Murray, 2010b). 
Whereas the ESS requires that countries "outside the bounds of international society 
[...] should rejoin the international community, and the EU should be ready to provide 
assistance" (European Council, 2003, p. 10), these examples show that certain 
comprehensive security concerns cannot be managed by Brussels without other 
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regional organisations. This is, third, further underlined by Koh, who stresses that 
ASEAN has played a vital role in stimulating peaceful dialogue between Japan and 
China – something Brussels has tried to no avail (in Murray, 2010a, p. 11). The 
examples also demonstrate that while the paper's critics may posit that the "first line 
of defence will often be abroad" (ibid., p. 6), a heteropolar, more complex world 
might not let CSDP address all necessary security challenges. Ideally, the EU will 
succeed in strengthening other regional organisations to an extent that they can 
take on their own regional realm of security. 
   Promoting its model more actively, and not just regarding 'abroad' as 'a line 
of defence', also shows a rethinking by the EU on the "referent object of security" 
(Guney, 2008, p. 129). Whereas 'the line of defence' positions the EU as the only 
referent object, displaying a rather Euro-centric view of security, promoting regional 
security institutionalization includes other regions as the referent object. It contributes 
to joint ownership and prevents what Guney calls "other-making" – increasing 
legitimacy respectively (ibid.).  
  Nevertheless, today the institutional capacities of ASEAN are still limited, 
implying that it might not be able to cope with emerging regional security 
challenges speedily and efficiently in the future (Acharya, 2008). Hence, instead of 
sending CSDP missions to distant localities, Brussels could seek to prop up the ASEAN 
secretariat, currently holding 60 recruited staff from only nine member states and 
approximately 200 local staff (Tavares, 2010). The limited budget added (e.g. €9 
million in 2007), this makes ASEAN "a weak organization from a financial and human 
resources perspective" (ibid., p. 93). Investing the money spent on AMM in ASEAN's 
budget would have almost tripled it (Annex 2). Increasing finances is one – albeit not 
the only – means to improve a regional security organisation's responsiveness to 
threats. Moreover, the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) functions as an important 
channel to guarantee that "many elements from EU are adopted to ASEAN" (De 
Lombaerde & Schulz, 2010, p. 291). Nonetheless, ASEM is lacking a secretariat despite 
the fact that Murray estimates that this would increase Brussels' influence (Murray, 
2010b). Thus, the setting up of such an institution should feature on the EU's agenda.  
Finally, the ASEAN Charter has set up three security-related institutions which have 
been inspired by the EU model: the Coordination Council (consisting of ASEAN 
foreign ministers, hence similar to the EU's Foreign Affairs Council (FAC)), the ASEAN 
political and security committee (ASPC) (taking after the Political and Security 
Committee (PSC)) and the Committee of Permanent Representatives to ASEAN 
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(resembling the Permanent Representatives' Committee (Coreper)) (Tavares, 2010). 
However, so far one can find no evidence of Brussels seeking to provide assistance or 
to model these institutions in cooperation with ASEAN. The EU might miss a key 
chance to set the parameters and frameworks in their consolidation. Khong shows 
that ASEAN's economic institutions in the 1990s have managed to log in a certain 
'we-ness' (Khong, 1997). Influencing this identity-building process in security institutions 
today is of importance to the EU if we follow the proposed policy reorientation. As 
Bretherton and Vogler highlight, a clear identity can positively condition consistent 
behaviour – a lesson which is also of crucial importance for today's rather aimless 
CSDP and its lofty policy documents such as the ESS (Bretherton & Vogler, 2006). 
Adopting the Ordnungsmacht approach would be a first step towards a beneficial 
tandem of identity and behaviour. In this context, the presence of public officials 
and experts' networks in the security sector, also referred to as epistemic 
communities, in both the EU and ASEAN can function as a tool to foster the 
abovementioned 'frameworks of authority' in the Asian organisation and overcome 
the absence of supranationality in the security sector (Sbragia, 2010).  
  Finally, the described approach could then also catch on with France – 
singled out in part 3 as one of the main opponents of the Ordnungsmacht approach 
as it might imperil their engagements in Africa. Strengthening African capacities in 
the AU framework through CSDP, and enhancing joint ownership, does not only offer 
a sustainable and continued commitment, but might equally allow Paris to discard its 
neo-colonial image in some African states.  
  In sum, this part has demonstrated that in the emerging heteropolar world the 
EU has a model to offer for regional organisations, which draws its strength from its 
institutions. The example of ASEAN shows that beneficial results can be achieved. 
Global policies flowing from the repositioning of CSDP as a regional Ordnungsmacht 
must of course be phased in consecutively. Thus, global civil-military engagement of 
CSDP is scaled down over time. In this period support missions to regional 
organisations, such as African Union Mission Sudan (AMIS), can function as transitory 
arrangements, as they stimulate joint ownership, financial implications are smaller 
and public support higher (Vanhoonacker, 2010). 
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 5. Conclusion and policy recommendations 
 
"Maxime peccantes, quia nihil peccare conantur." 
Latin proverb 
 
This paper has investigated to what extent it would be beneficial for the Union 
to focus CSDP on a regional rather than global level. It has put forward the argument 
that positioning CSDP as a regional Ordnungsmacht helps the EU tackle long-
standing structural security challenges while simultaneously offering a viable 
approach to the EU's global responsibilities. The paper can now propose some initial 
steps to answering the questions of what means (power), what goals (order), and 
what geography (scope) for the previously "unidentified political object" CSDP 
(Zielonka, 2006, p. 4). 
 The power of CSDP has to be rethought in the face of diminutive means. In the 
EU resources are scarce, necessary capabilities for global engagement are lacking 
and member states' defence budgets and expenditures are shrinking. Hence, 
instead of maintaining a global rhetoric at odds with realities, a regional repositioning 
of CSDP is necessary to bring power ambitions and means in balance. 
  To be prepared for these challenges, the ESS should clearly state CSDP's 
regional ambitions and reduce its radius of activity from 12,000 to 3,500 km. Money 
saved from diminishing global engagements should be reinvested in the following 
regional priorities: First, understaffed CSDP missions need to be propped up to 
increase chances of success, whilst missions under NATO mandate should have a 
fixed date for CSDP to take over. Second, comprehensiveness of CSDP engagement 
is a priority of the Ordnungsmacht concept. So-called "civilian battlegroups" of 
judges and civilian experts can help CSDP make an impact in troubled neighbouring 
countries (Coelmont, 2010). Third, one key pillar of the proposed CSDP's smart power 
must be strengthened: public diplomacy. As the Ordnungsmacht concept offers a 
clear regional message, this point must be communicated. A revised ESS should 
contain a provision obliging EU governments to promote the grand strategy at home. 
A newly created European public diplomacy unit should then gather continuous 
day-to-day support for CSDP missions. Underlining the green footprint of a regional 
actor should be developed as one of the selling points in this respect. To kick off this 
process of public diplomacy, a region-wide campaign could spread the core 
message of CSDP's new security identity: a regional actor for regional challenges. 
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  Order is rooted in two goals. Regionally, a functional and geographical 
division of labour between NATO and the EU is envisaged. This new impetus in NATO-
CSDP relations eases tensions in the traditional triangle of regional stakeholders: the 
US, Russia and Turkey. Globally, a heteropolar world incites a rethinking of order 
along the lines of regional organisations as key units of the system. Strengthening 
them, particularly their institutional capacities, is seen as an alternative to global 
CSDP engagement, as is shown through the example of ASEAN. In the future, the EU's 
comparative advantage of institutional knowledge might not only be necessary to 
facilitate cooperation but needed to bring about cooperation at all. 
  To produce the proposed order, the ESS and NSC need to incorporate this 
division of labour. Moreover, a revised ESS needs to outline distinct sub-strategies for 
the three regional stakeholders. In this context, Moïsi's idea of a "European Monroe 
doctrine" (Moïsi, 2003, p. 520) to clearly delineate the EU spheres of influence and 
facilitate this division of labour is encouraging. In the same vein, sub-strategies for the 
regional organisations with a security component (ASEAN, AU, MERCOSUR etc.) must 
be set out. To complement these efforts, institutional security cooperation should be 
elevated to a fourth pillar of region-to-region contacts. One could think of 
'institutional battlegroups', staffed with experts from EU security organs, to provide a 
framework toolkit for other organisations.  
  Geography highlights the scope of action. Reducing CSDP's scope to the 
neighbourhood appears to be of mutual benefit to the EU and target countries. The 
virtuous circle of regional commitment, credibility and public diplomacy underlines 
this (Figure 4). Consequently, an improved ENP-CSDP nexus and more tangible results 
in a limited but conflict-prone region can be expected. Thus, taking one step back 
geographically might translate into doing less but better and will eventually "mean 
two steps ahead for [CSDP's] performance as a security actor" (Franke, 2009, p. 24). 
These steps are facilitated by endowing CSDP with a clear regional identity which is 
deemed to produce more coherent and consistent behaviour.  
  To ensure mutual benefit a revised ESS ought to include sub-strategies on the 
respective target states. These strategies should spell out clearly what security 
challenges exist in each country, how and in what timeframe they will be tackled, 
what means are necessary and how public and domestic support for the activities is 
gathered. These and future efforts taken together have the potential to pave the 
way for CSDP's journey to itself. CSDP, nosce te ipsum!  
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Annexes 
 
Annex 1: Ordnungsmacht in comparison with today's CSDP 
  Key Concept  Ordnungsmacht Today's  CSDP 
Rise to power  Reciprocal justification  Yes 
Maintenance of 
power 
Comprehensive, 
Redistribution center - 
periphery 
Partially 
Means 
(Power) 
Decline of power  Internal and external 
necessity for legitimacy  
Partially 
Rise of order  Dense network of rules  Yes  
Maintenance of 
order 
Structuring mutual 
beneficial security 
environment 
Partially 
Goal 
(Order) 
Decline of order  Partners to be 
accommodated 
Partially 
Rise of 
geographical scope 
Resources determine 
ambitions - regional scope  
No 
Maintenance of 
geographical scope 
Security sector only   Yes 
Scope 
(Geography) 
Decline of 
geographical scope 
Limiting overstretch  No 
 
Source: author's compilation  
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Annex 2: Estimates of CSDP missions' expenditure7 
 
Mission  Common Costs (in Mio €)  Overall Costs (in Mio €) 
   
1. Europe    
   
EUFOR Concordia (c)  4.7 (nA)  6.2  
EUPOL Proxima (c)    30.95  
 
EUPAT (c)    1.5 
EUJUST Themis (c)    2.1  
EUPM   122.31   
EUFOR Althea  ~1506
  ~1500  
EUBAM   44.2   
EULEX Kosovo    265  
EUMM Georgia    49.6  
   
Total Europe    
9 missions  154.7 (49,36% of total)  2021.86 (43,29% of total) 
   
2. Africa    
   
OPERATION Artemis (c)  7 (nA)  70 
EUPOL Kinshasa (c)    4.3  
SUPPORT Amis I + II (c)  1.3 (in 2007 for Amis I)  212 (from EDF for Amis II)  
                                                            
6 The initial reference amount for the common costs amounted to €71.7 million of which only 
about €30 million were spent in the first year. If we assume a constant annual expenditure of 
approximately €30 million in the five years of operational activity we reach common cost of 
€150 million. Marangoni op. cit. assumes a ratio of 1:10 between common and overall costs, 
which explains overall costs of €1.5 billion. This figure would be supported by selected, 
indicative member states' expenditure on mission Althea: Germany, for example, has spent 
€178 million in three years, while Italy spent about €90 million in nine months.   
7 based on previous research by Agence Europe, op. cit.; Council Secretariat, "Financing of 
ESDP operations", EU Council Secretariat Factsheet, Brussels, Council Secretariat, 2007; Grevi 
et al., op. cit.; Marangoni, op. cit.; Overall costs generally include common costs.  Common 
costs refer to the Athena mechanism if not specified otherwise. Figures are based on data 
available as of March 2010 and include, where possible, the budgetary year 2009. 
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cont. 
 
 
EUPOL RD Congo    6.9  
EUSSR Guinea-Bissau    5.6  
EU Naval Operation 
Atalanta 
8.4 (for first 12 months)  ~ 800  
EUTM Somalia  
(in preparation) 
 6.6  (planned) 
   
Total Africa    
10 missions  158.7 (50,64% of total)  2455.5 (52,58% of total) 
   
3. Asia    
   
AMM (c)    15  
EUJUST LEX    29.3  
EUBAM Rafah    17.1  
EUPOL COPPS    23.6  
EUPOL Afghanistan    107.6  
   
Total Asia    
5 missions  -  192.6 (4,12% of total) 
   
Total All     
24 missions  313.4 (100% of total)  4669.96 (100% of total) 
(c)  =  mission completed 
(nA)   =  not financed by Athena mechanism 
 
Source: author's compilation 
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Annex 3: Classical multipolarity, multilateral multipolarity and heteropolarity 
compared 
 
 Classical 
Multipolarity 
Multilateral 
Multipolarity 
Heteropolarity 
Character of 
power 
military military  (?)  with  taming 
influence of rules 
different in kind 
Diffusion of 
power 
clustered around 
military 
clustered around 
military or other power 
widely dispersed 
Comparison of 
power / poles 
easy: military as 
benchmark 
medium: clustered 
power as benchmark, 
taking into 
consideration respect 
for rules 
hard: 
heterogeneous 
character of power 
impedes 
comparison 
Legitimacy  anarchy in system, 
legitimacy of the 
strongest 
tamed system, 
legitimacy is important 
and relies on respect 
for rules 
tamed system, 
legitimacy vital, 
relies on rules and 
public support 
Poles  states regions  regional 
organisations 
Poles' mode of 
interaction 
competitive cooperative  cooperative 
 
Source: author's compilation 
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